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Managerial diseconomies of scale at the firm level is a topic seldom discussed and 
rarely studied. In fact, many observers doubt that diseconomies of scale exist. The 
purpose of the current research (Canbäck 2002), summarised in this paper, is to open 
up avenues of inquiry into this potentially important research topic. 
Abstract
The research tests Oliver Williamson’s proposition that transaction cost economics 
can explain the limits of firm size. Williamson suggests that diseconomies of scale are 
manifested through four interrelated factors: atmospheric consequences due to 
specialisation, bureaucratic insularity, incentive limits of the employment relation and 
communication distortion due to bounded rationality. Furthermore, Williamson argues 
that diseconomies of scale are counteracted by economies of scale and can be 
moderated by adoption of the multidivisional organisation form and by high internal 
asset specificity. Combined, these influences tend to cancel out and thus there is not a 
strong, directly observable, relationship between a large firm’s size and performance. 
A review of the relevant literature, including transaction cost economics, sociological 
studies of bureaucracy, information-processing perspectives on the firm, agency 
theory, and studies of incentives and motivation within firms, as well as empirical 
studies of trends in firm size and industry concentration, corroborates Williamson’s 
theoretical framework and translates it into five hypotheses: (1) Bureaucratic failure, 
in the form of atmospheric consequences, bureaucratic insularity, incentive limits and 
communication distortion, increases with firm size; (2) Large firms exhibit economies 
of scale; (3) Diseconomies of scale from bureaucratic failure have a negative impact 
on firm performance; (4) Economies of scale increase the relative profitability of large 
firms over smaller firms; and (5) Diseconomies of scale are moderated by two 
transaction cost-related factors: organisation form and asset specificity. 
The hypotheses are tested by applying structural equation models to primary and 
secondary cross-sectional data from 784 large US manufacturing firms. The statistical 
analyses confirm the hypotheses. Thus, diseconomies of scale influence the growth 
and profitability of firms negatively, while economies of scale and the moderating 
factors have positive influences. This implies that executives and directors of large 
firms should pay attention to bureaucratic failure. 2
Problem Definition 
Diseconomies of scale are a neglected area of study. Observers from Knight 
([1921] 1964) to Holmström and Tirole (1989) have pointed out that our 
understanding of bureaucratic failure is low. The neglect is to some extent due to a 
disbelief in the existence of diseconomies of scale (e.g., Florence 1933, 12; Bain 
1968, 176). It is also due to a dearth of theoretical frameworks that can help inform 
our understanding of the nature of diseconomies of scale. 
However, if diseconomies of scale did not exist, then we would presumably see much 
larger firms than we do today (Panzar 1989, 38). At the time of the research, no 
business organisation in the United States had more than one million employees or 
more than ten hierarchical levels. No firm has ever been able successfully to compete 
in multiple markets with a diverse product range for an extended period of time. 
Common sense tells us that there are limits to firm size. Common sense does not, 
however, prove the point. Unfortunately, scientific inquiry has not yet focused on 
finding such proof. 
Cost curves are used in neoclassical theory to illustrate economies and diseconomies 
of scale. McConnell’s quantification (1945, 6) and Stigler’s illustration (1958, 59), 
reproduced in Figure 1, are typical. 
Figure 1. McConnell/Stigler Relationship between Unit Cost and Output 
If the curve above is correct, it is still unclear why the cost curve bends upwards at 
2 M , but empirical evidence suggests it does. The concentration in the US 
manufacturing sector has changed little or has declined over much of the last century 
(e.g., Nutter 1951; Bain 1968; Mueller and Hamm 1974; Scherer and Ross 1990). The 
size of large manufacturing firms has kept pace with the overall growth of the 
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manufacturing part of the economy since the 1960s in value-added terms, but has 
declined in employment terms since 1979 and has declined relative to the total US 
corporate sector and the global corporate sector (e.g., Bain 1968; Allen 1976; 
Adelman 1978; Bock 1978; Scherer and Ross 1990; Sutton 1997; Farrell 1998) ). This 
empirical evidence supports the notion that the cost curve bends upwards at some 
point.
Limits-of-firm-size is, nevertheless, not a major field of study (Holmström and Tirole 
1989; Coase 1993a). Given the relative slowdown in the growth of large firms over 
the last 30 years, understanding why market-based transactions are slowly winning 
over internally-based transactions matters more than ever. 4
Literature Review 
Williamson (1975, 126-130) found that the limits of firm size are bureaucratic in 
origin and can be explained by transaction cost economics. He identified four main 
categories of diseconomies of scale: 
Atmospheric consequences. According to Williamson (1975, 128-129), as firms 
expand there will be increased specialisation, but also less commitment on the part of 
employees. In such firms, the employees often have a hard time understanding the 
purpose of corporate activities, as well as the small contribution each of them makes 
to the whole. Thus, alienation is more likely to occur in large firms. 
Bureaucratic insularity. Williamson (1975) argued that as firms increase in size, 
senior managers are less accountable to the lower ranks of the organisation (p. 127) 
and to shareholders (p. 142). They thus become insulated from reality and will, given 
opportunism, strive to maximise their personal benefits rather than overall corporate 
performance. According to Williamson, this problem is most acute in organisations 
with well-established procedures and rules and in which management is well-
entrenched. As a consequence, large firms tend towards organisational slack. 
Incentive limits of the employment relation. Williamson (1975, 129-130) argued 
that the structure of incentives large firms offer employees is limited by a number of 
factors. First, large bonus payments may threaten senior managers. Second, 
performance-related bonuses may encourage less-than-optimal employee behaviour in 
large firms. Therefore, large firms tend to base incentives on tenure and position 
rather than on merit. Such limitations may especially affect executive positions and 
product development functions, putting large firms at a disadvantage when compared 
with smaller enterprises in which employees are often given a direct stake in the 
success of the firm through bonuses, share participation, and stock options. 
Communication distortion due to bounded rationality. Because a single manager 
has cognitive limits and cannot understand every aspect of a complex organisation, it 
is impossible to expand a firm without adding hierarchical layers. Information passed 
between layers inevitably becomes distorted. This reduces the ability of high-level 
executives to make decisions based on facts and negatively impacts their ability to 
strategise and respond directly to the market. Williamson (1967) found that even 
under static conditions there is a loss of control. 
The nature of these diseconomies of scale is supported by the theoretical and 
empirical economics and sociology literature. Table 1 summarises the authorities 
(which are fully discussed in Chapter 3 of the complete thesis). 5
Table 1. Sources of Limits of Firm Size 




Insularity  Incentive Limits  
Communication 
Distortion  
Arrow (1974): Rigidity to 
change 
Blau and Meyer (1987): 
Excessive rigidity 




Child (1973): Insularity 




Kwoka (1980): Low job 
satisfaction in large 
firms
Merton (1957): Rigidity 
Pugh et al. (1969): 
Insularity from reality 
Qian (1994): Monitoring 
costs/inadequate effort 
levels
Scherer (1976): Low job 








Blau and Meyer (1987): 
Excessive rigidity 
Brock (1987): Risk 
aversion 
Carroll and Hannan 
(2000): Firm age leads 
to insularity 
Child (1973): Insularity 
Crozier (1964): Rigidity 
Jensen (1986): Firms 
larger than optimum 
Merton (1957): Rigidity 








Pugh et al. (1969): 
Insularity from reality 
Schmookler (1972): 
Understanding market 






Axtell (1999): Free-rider 
problem 
Blau and Meyer (1987): 
Excessive rigidity 
Cooper (1964): R&D 
incentives 
Crozier (1964): Rigidity 
Olson (1982):Absence 
of selective incentives 
Peters (1992): Low 
productivity in R&D 




Quality of R&D 
employees 
Silver and Auster 
(1969): Limits to 
entrepreneurship 
Williamson (1996): 
Weaker incentives in 
bureaucracies 
Zenger (1989, 1994): 
Employment contract 
disincentives in R&D 
Arrow (1974): 
Specialisation leads to 
poor communication 
Arrow (1983): 
Information loss in R&D 
Barnard ([1938] 1968): 
Communication losses 






McAfee and McMillan 
(1995): Lower efficiency 
Mookherjee and 
Reichelstein (2001): No 
control loss under 
certain restrictive 
conditions 
Simon ([1947] 1976): 
Processing bottlenecks 
While the four categories relating to diseconomies of scale theoretically impose size 
limits on firms, three factors tend to offset diseconomies of scale: economies of scale, 
organisation form and degree of integration. All are central to transaction cost 
economics, and in order to test the validity of the diseconomies-of-scale argument, it 
is necessary to account for these factors. 
Economies of scale. Transaction cost economics does not usually deal with 
economies of scale, which are more often associated with neoclassical production 
costs. However, Riordan and Williamson (1985) made an explicit attempt to reconcile 
neoclassical theory and transaction cost economics and showed, among other things, 6
that economies of scale are evident in both production costs (p. 371) and transaction 
costs (p. 373), and that both can be kept internal to a firm if the asset specificity is 
positive. That is, economies of scale can be reaped by the individual firm and are not 
necessarily available to all participants in a market (pp. 367-369). This is at odds with 
much of the literature. 
Organisation form. Williamson (1975, 117) recognised that diseconomies of scale 
can be reduced by organising appropriately. Based on Chandler’s pioneering work 
(e.g., 1962) on the evolution of the American corporation, Williamson argued that the 
M-form organisation lowers internal transaction costs compared to the U-form 
organisation. It does so for a key reason: The M-form allows most senior executives 
to focus on high-level issues rather than day-to-day operational details, making the 
whole greater than the sum of its parts (p. 137). Thus, large firms organised according 
to the M-form should perform better than similar U-form firms. 
Asset specificity. Williamson showed that asset specificity is the most important 
determinant of degree of integration (e.g., Riordan and Williamson 1985, 366). Asset 
specificity influences integration from a geographic reach, product breadth, and 
vertical depth point of view. 
Geographic reach. Teece (1976) showed that multinational firms only exist because 
the combination of asset specificity and opportunism leads to moral hazard, which is 
difficult to contain in market transactions. Without, for example, human asset 
specificity, a firm could just as easily license its technology to a firm in another 
country, reaping the benefits of development. Tsokhas (1986) illustrated this in a case 
study of the Australian mining industry. Other studies have shown that market 
diversity reduces profitability (e.g., Bane and Neubauer 1981). 
Product breadth. A number of studies of product breadth show that asset specificity 
plays a major role in explaining the success and failure of diversification. Rumelt 
(1974) found a strong correlation between profitability and human asset specificity—
in this case the degree to which a firm draws on common core skills or resources 
(pp. 121-127). 
Vertical depth. Asset specificity has repeatedly been shown to be the primary 
determinant of vertical integration. A number of empirical studies confirm this (e.g., 
Masten 1984; Masten, Meehan and Snyder 1989, 1991; Monteverde and Teece 1982; 
Joskow 1993; Klier 1993; Krickx 1988). 
Again, the literature supports Williamson’s theoretical argument, except for the 
reasoning regarding economies of scale (where the literature is inconclusive). Table 2 
summarises the authorities (which are fully discussed in Chapter 3 of the complete 
thesis). 7
Table 2. Potential Moderators of Diseconomies of Scale 
POTENTIAL MODERATORS OF DISECONOMIES OF SCALE 
Economies of Scale  M-Form Organisation  Asset Specificity 
Adams and Brock (1986), 
Peters (1992): Myth of 
economies of scale 
Bain (1968), Scherer and 
Ross (1990): Economies of 
scale exhausted at 
moderate firm size 
Masten (1982), North and 
Wallis (1994): Economies 
of scale not proprietary to 
individual firms 
Ijiri and Simon (1964), 
Lucas (1978), Nelson and 
Winter (1982), Rumelt and 
Wensley (1981), Simon and 
Bonini (1958): Stochastic 
growth processes, not 
economies of scale, explain 
firm size-distribution 
Armour and Teece (1978): 
M-form increases ROE 
Chandler (e.g., 1962), 
Chandler and Daems 
(1980): M-form alleviates 






Decentralisation is critical to 
firm performance 
Teece (1981): M-form firms 
are significantly better 
performers than U-form 
firms
Bane and Neubauer (1981): 
Market diversity reduces 
profitability 
Coase (1993b): No 
distinction between vertical 
and lateral integration 
Grossman and Hart (1986), 
Teece (e.g., 1976): TCE 
applies to lateral integration 
Mahoney (1992), 
Holmström and Roberts 
(1998): Uncertainty and 
frequency not important 
Masten (1984), Masten et 
al. (1989, 1991), 
Monteverde and Teece 
(1982), Joskow (1993), 
Klier (1993), Krickx (1988): 
Asset specificity more 
important than uncertainty 
and frequency 
Rumelt (1974): Product 
diversity reduces asset 
specificity 
Teece (1976), Tsokhas 
(1986): Asset specificity 
influences geographic 
reach
Walker and Weber (1984, 
1987): Volume uncertainty 
is weak factor 8
Theoretical Framework and Research Hypotheses 
The literature review discussed the theoretical and empirical studies that inform the 
current research. The findings are now translated into five hypotheses: 
H1: Bureaucratic failure, in the form of atmospheric consequences, bureaucratic 
insularity, incentive limits and communication distortion, increases with firm size 
H2: Large firms exhibit economies of scale 
H3: Diseconomies of scale from bureaucratic failure have a negative impact on firm 
performance 
H3a:  Atmospheric consequences have a negative impact on the performance of 
large firms 
H3b: Bureaucratic insularity has a negative impact on the performance of large 
firms 
H3c:  Incentive limits have a negative impact on the performance of large firms 
H3d: Communication distortion has a negative impact on the performance of 
large firms 
H4: Economies of scale increase the relative profitability of large firms over smaller 
firms 
H5: Diseconomies of scale are moderated by two transaction cost-related factors: 
organisation form and asset specificity 
H5a:  Large M-form firms perform better than large U-form firms 
H5b: High internal asset specificity affects a firm’s performance positively 
Figure 2 summarises the hypotheses graphically in a theoretical framework. The 
expectation is that as the overall relationship between firm performance and size is 
deconstructed, insights into the true nature of managerial diseconomies of scale will 
be gained. 9
Figure 2. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
The question remains: are the hypothesised effects large enough materially to 
influence the performance of a large firm? Only an empirical analysis, in which the 
framework and hypotheses are operationalised, will answer this. The next two 










































The research uses a positivist approach emphasising universal understanding in 
Runkel and McGrath’s terms (1972, 81-89). There are no studies of this general type 
on the particular issue of diseconomies of scale. However, generalised studies on, for 
example, the profit impact of an M-form organisation or the link between size, 
structure and complexity are widely quoted in the literature (e.g., Rumelt 1974; 
Ramanujam and Varadarajan 1989). 
Among different multivariate techniques, structural equation modelling (SEM) was 
picked based on Hair et al.’s classification scheme for choosing among techniques 
(1998, 20-21) and a review of the pertinent literature on SEM (Bollen 1989, 1-9; 
Kelloway 1998, 2-3; Maruyama 1998, 20-24). SEM is the most appropriate technique 
when multiple relationships between dependent and independent variables are studied. 
Moreover, SEM is well suited for confirmatory analysis and allows for efficient 
hypothesis testing, especially of complex models. Finally, SEM allows for the use of 
latent, unobserved variables. 
The analyses were cross-sectional. Data were collected for publicly traded 
manufacturing firms (SIC codes 10-39) with headquarters in the US and with sales of 
more than $500 million. The benchmark period was 1998. Primary and secondary 
data were derived from several sources, including company organisation charts, 
official filings such as 10-Ks and proxy statements, annual reports, biographies of 
executives, historical company documents, corporate web sites, articles in Business
Week and Fortune, corporate watchdogs, Compustat and academic research. Table 3 
describes the most important variables used in the analyses. 
Table 3. Overview of Variables Used in the Analyses 
OVERVIEW OF VARIABLES USED IN THE ANALYSES 




formation K-S  z
Employees  No. of employees  ’000  Compustat  784  atan  1.28 
Atmospheric 
Consequences 
Unit labour cost 
defined as labour 
cost ⁄ employees 
$’000 Compustat  146  sqrt  0.59
Leadership 
Tenure 
Average years of 
employment with 
firm for officers 
Years 10-Ks,  proxy 
statements. annual 
reports, corporate web 
sites, executive 
biographies 
163 none  0.85
Company Age  Years since 
founding of 
company 
Years 10-Ks,  proxy 
statements. annual 
reports, corporate web 
sites, historical sources 
638 none  2.25
Incentive Limits  Research and 
development 
expense ⁄ Sales 
% Compustat  489  ln  0.76
Communication 
Distortion 
No. of hierarchical 
levels
# Annual  reports, 
corporate web sites, 10-
Ks, company 
organisation charts 
386 ln  0.7111
Economies of 
Scale
Defined as (fixed 
cost)
2 ⁄ sales 
$M Compustat  752  ln  0.82
Geographic 
Reach 
% of sales derived 
outside the United 
States
% Compustat,  annual 
reports, 10-Ks 
663 ln  3.37
Product
Breadth
Defined as the 
diversification ratio 
(1 í Rumelt’s 
specialisation ratio) 
% Compustat,  annual 
reports, 10-Ks, 
corporate web sites 
670 ln  5.24
Vertical Depth  2 = Very high;  
1 = High;  
0 = Average or low 
Ordinal  10-Ks, annual reports, 
corporate web sites, 
Compustat
675 not  meaningful 
Governance Qualitative  rankings  Index Business Week, IRRC, 
Fortune
229 inv  0.64
Divisionalisation  2 = Divisionalised;  
1 = Hybrid;  
0 = Unitary 
Ordinal 10-Ks,  proxy 
statements, annual 
reports, corporate web 
sites
375 not  meaningful 
Growth 5-year  compound 
annual growth rate 
(1993-1998) 
% Compustat  756  atan  0.84 
Profitability Economic  value 
added defined as 
return on equity less 
cost of equity 
% Compustat,  Ibbotsen 
Associates (1999) 
781 atan  0.57 
Note: K-S = Kolmogorov-Smirnov
The data was screened extensively for missing values, non-normality, non-linearity, 
heteroscedasticity, etc. Despite issues such as many missing values, non-normality of 
certain variables and some heteroscedasticity, the data was deemed more than 
sufficiently robust for the structural equation models. 12
Results 
Figure 3 shows a path diagram for the most important statistical analysis (sub-model 
b) of the research (the complete thesis contains 21 path diagrams). 
Figure 3. Complete Sub-Model b
This analysis tests hypotheses 3, 4 and 5 (sub-model a tests hypotheses 1 and 2) and 
depicts the delicate balance between factors that reduce the limits of firm size and 
those that increase the limits. A positive regression weight increases the limits and a 
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negative regression weight reduces the limits. In general, the diseconomies of scale 
have a stronger negative influence on growth than on profitability, while the positive 
influence of economies of scale, M-form organisation and high internal asset 
specificity is larger on profitability than on growth. 
Table 4 reports the coefficients and the statistical significance of the analysis. The 
regression coefficients are of the hypothesised sign (except for the non-significant 
Communication Distortion o Growth) and most coefficients are significant at the 
5% or better level. 
Table 4. Regression Weights for Complete Sub-Model b




Coeff. S.E. C.R. 
Atmospheric Consequences ĺ Growth  í0.142 í0.057 0.041  í1.417***
Atmospheric Consequences ĺ
Profitability  í0.087 í0.049 0.066  í0.746***
Bureaucratic Insularity ĺ Growth  í0.609 í0.120 0.036  í3.348***
Bureaucratic Insularity ĺ Profitability  í0.465 í0.128 0.103  í1.244***
Bureaucratic Insularity ĺ Leadership 
Tenure  0.531 0.263 0.050  5.244***
Bureaucratic Insularity ĺ Company Age  0.740 1.000   
Company Age ĺ Profitability  0.386 0.079 0.047  1.689
†**
Incentive Limits ĺ Growth  í0.059 í0.019 0.027  í0.706***
Incentive Limits ĺ Profitability  í0.375 í0.170 0.063  í2.688***
Communication Distortion ĺ Growth  0.092 0.333 0.312  1.067***
Communication Distortion ĺ Profitability  í0.157 í0.793 0.833  í0.952***
Economies of Scale ĺ Profitability  0.483 0.176 0.079  2.232***
Asset Specificity ĺ Growth  0.149 1.000   
Asset Specificity ĺ Profitability  0.365 3.431 2.213  1.550***
Asset Specificity ĺ Geographic Reach  í0.507 í1.487 0.675  í2.201***
Asset Specificity ĺ Product Breadth  í0.268 í0.880 0.421  í2.091***
Asset Specificity ĺ Vertical Depth  í0.179 í1.510 0.806  í1.872
†**
M-Form ĺ Growth  0.213 0.168 0.117  1.427***
M-Form ĺ Profitability  0.498 0.548 0.409  1.339***
M-Form ĺ Governance  0.819 1.000   
M-Form ĺ Divisionalisation  0.163 0.270 0.169  1.596***
† p<10%, * p<5%, ** p<1%, *** p<0.1% (two-tailed)
The findings in this, and other analyses not reported here, are robust for a number of 
reasons. The data were screened and tested extensively. They were found to be well-
behaved in most respects. The path diagrams confirm well with the underlying theory. 
The indicators appear to reflect the unobserved phenomena fairly well. Finally, the 
results were similar when random sub-samples were used. 
The practical significance of the statistical analyses is that both sub-model b (and sub-
model a) validate Williamson’s theoretical framework (see Figure 2, page 9, above). 
Both the main analyses and the supporting analyses that tested particular aspects of 
the theory are in line with the theoretical predictions. 14
Table 5 summarises the literature findings and the full set of statistical analyses. All 
hypotheses were confirmed at better than 5% significance
1 (except H3d, which was 
inconclusive) and each statistical model had an overall fit which was acceptable or 
better. Combined with the findings from the literature, this implies that firms have to 
balance a number of countervailing forces to reach a performance optimum. For 
example, it is unlikely that geographic or product expansion alone will improve 
corporate performance. Only when the expansion is done in conjunction with other 
adjustments, aimed at reducing the diseconomies of scale or capturing the benefits of 
M-form organisation, is it likely that performance will improve. 
Table 5.Summary of Findings 




Finding  Result Significance 
H1: Bureaucratic failure, in the form of 
atmospheric consequences, bureaucratic 
insularity, incentive limits and communication 
distortion, increases with firm size  
Confirmed Confirmed p<1% 
H2: Large firms exhibit economies of scale   Confirmed Confirmed p<0.1% 
H3: Diseconomies of scale from bureaucratic 
failure have a negative impact on firm 
performance  
Confirmed Confirmed see H3a - H3d
H3a: Atmospheric consequences have a negative 
impact on the performance of large firms  
Confirmed Confirmed p<10% 
H3b: Bureaucratic insularity has a negative impact 
on the performance of large firms  
Confirmed Confirmed p<0.1% 
H3c: Incentive limits have a negative impact on 
the performance of large firms  
Confirmed Confirmed p<0.1% 
H3d: Communication distortion has a negative 
impact on the performance of large firms  
Confirmed Inconclusive  p=21.2% 
H4: Economies of scale increase the relative 
profitability of large firms over smaller firms  
Inconclusive Confirmed  p<1% 
H5: Diseconomies of scale are moderated by two 
transaction cost-related factors: organisation 
form and asset specificity  
Confirmed Confirmed see H5a - H5b
H5a: Large M-form firms perform better than large 
U-form firms
Confirmed Confirmed p<10% 
H5b: High internal asset specificity affects a firm’s 
performance positively  
Confirmed Confirmed p<1% 
1  Two sub-hypotheses (H3a and H5a) were significant at p<10%. 15
Interpretation and Discussion 
As was shown in Table 5, the theoretical framework is supported by both the 
literature and the statistical findings. It is now possible to interpret the findings by 
returning to the neoclassical cost curves. First, the cost curve shown in Figure 1 is 
modified to reflect the characteristics of diseconomies of scale, economies of scale 
and the moderating factors. Second, a similar curve is constructed for firm growth. 
Third, these two curves are combined to show the overall impact of these two factors 
on firm performance. 
Average cost. To begin with, the elongated U-shaped average total cost curve used in 
neoclassical theory can be split into two parts: the average production cost curve and 
the average transaction cost curve. The modified cost curves are depicted in a stylised 
fashion in Figure 4. The top graph shows a curve for average production cost  ) ( P AC
consistent with the findings in the current research. 
The middle graph in Figure 4 shows the average transaction cost curve  ). ( T AC  The 
middle graph also shows a shifted and slightly tilted average transaction cost curve 
). ( T C A c  The curve reflects the positive contribution from the moderating factors. 
T C A c  is supported by the literature and by the statistical analysis. This analysis 
indicates that the shift can be quite large. 
Finally, the bottom graph in Figure 4 shows the average total cost curve (AC), with a 
shifted curve  C A c for the moderators (AC =  P AC + T AC ; C A c =  P AC  + T C A c ). The 
curve resembles the neoclassical curve in Figure 1. 16
Figure 4. Stylised Cost Curves 
Growth. The underlying logic of the cost curves can also be applied to firm growth. 
Figure 5 shows the same set of graphs as above for the relationship between firm 
growth and output. The top graph illustrates the relationship between growth and 
output, under the hypothetical assumption that firms only have neoclassical 
production costs  ). ( P G  The middle graph in Figure 5 portrays the growth curve 
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Figure 5 convolutes the production- and transaction-cost contributions to growth into 
overall growth (G). The graph shows that the growth capacity of firms is steadily 
declining as a function of output, but it can be moderated  ). (Gc
Figure 5. Stylised Growth Curves 
Performance. Finally, it is instructive to combine the cost and growth curves to see 
how they jointly contribute to a firm’s performance (Figure 6). Other factors also 
contribute to firm performance and the graph shows the partial contribution to 
performance.
2 By convoluting the average total cost (AC) and growth (G) curves, the 
partial performance curve < results. 
2  Total performance (ȌTOT) is a function of, profitability(S), growth(G), risk(E) and other factors (H):




























































Figure 6. Stylised Partial Performance Curve 
The set of curves discussed above agree well with neoclassical theory (e.g., Panzar 
1989) and transaction cost economics (e.g., Williamson 1975), individually. The 
curves also agree with the joined perspectives on production and transaction costs 
expressed by, for example, Riordan and Williamson (1985) and Wallis and North 
(1986).
The conceptual curves depicted in Figures 4 to 6 can also be used to show the shape 
of the data in the sample of 784 firms. This was done with three analyses which 
replicated the cost (AC), growth (G) and partial performance (<) curves. Figures 7 to 
9 show the resulting graphs, which are surprisingly similar to the conceptual curves. It 
should be remembered though, that the scatterplots presented are somewhat 
simplistic. They use the sample data as is and no attempt was made to include control 
variables or to make other corrections. 
First, Figure 7 reports the results for the cost curve (AC), which plots average total 
cost against output. A quadratic regression line has been added to show the underlying 
trend in the data. The data conforms well to the conceptual AC curve in Figure 4. 
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Figure 7. Cost Curve for Current Sample 
Second, growth data was plotted against output (Figure 8). Again, the curve has the 
predicted shape and the quadratic regression line is similar to the conceptual G curve 
in Figure 5. The plot points are quite scattered though, and firms seem to have 
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Figure 8. Growth Curve for Current Sample 
Third, the joint contribution to firm performance by the two factors is shown in Figure 
9. The performance curve (<) is not unlike the conceptual curve shown in Figure 6. 
There is significant variation around the trend line, but overall the data conforms to 
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Conclusion
There are a number of real-life implications of the research. First, strategy and 
structure appear to be intimately linked. Executives at large corporations have to 
grapple with real trade-offs when they consider expansion. Certain growth strategies 
are easier to execute than others, and the choice of organisation has major 
implications for which strategies make sense. Indeed, structure does not necessarily 
follow strategy; strategy and structure inform each other continuously and forever. 
Second, much of the rationale for mergers and acquisitions seems to be weak, at best. 
Proponents of mergers typically argue that the resulting larger entity after a merger 
will realise economies of scale, benefiting customers and shareholders; in addition, 
they claim that growth will be accelerated through the introduction of new products 
and services that were previously too expensive to develop. But the analysis here 
shows that although some economies of scale may be realised, they are likely to be 
offset by diseconomies of scale. Furthermore, there is no evidence that larger, merged 
entities innovate more and grow faster. Instead, the opposite appears to be true: 
innovation and growth decline. 
Third, boards of directors may want to emphasise the importance of executive 
renewal and the elimination of rigid processes to stimulate growth. Maximising the 
quality of governance, which is part of the board’s fiduciary duties, appears to be an 
important lever for addressing these issues. 
Fourth, firms that strive for high internal asset specificity appear to be better off than 
those that expand reach, breadth, or depth. This does not imply that single-product or 
single-geography strategies are optimal (because this reduces growth in the long run), 
but it does imply that any expansion strategy should strive for high asset specificity 
and that some firms are best off reducing their scope of activities. 
Finally, in a world in which companies increasingly try to sell solutions rather than 
basic products and services, incentive limits have become real and problematic. In 
businesses that involve team selling or large product-development efforts, attention 
should be paid to creating well-functioning incentive schemes for employees. The 
superior productivity of research and development in small firms, in which incentives 
are tailored to individual performance, demonstrates why effective incentive schemes 
matter. 
From a research perspective, the current work indicates a number of opportunities for 
further study. For example, the statistical analyses indicate yet another way to put 
Gibrat’s law of proportional effects (1931, 74-81) into doubt. The thesis also suggests 
four areas for further research: (1) proving the existence of diseconomies of scale by 
studying a more narrowly defined problem such as focusing on an industry rather than 
a whole economic sector; (2) expanding the analysis across geography and time; (3) 
finding better ways to operationalise unobserved diseconomies of scale; and (4) 
replicating the current research with better statistical approaches and a larger sample, 
with a particular eye towards industry effects. 23
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